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Abstract:   
This paper studies comparative risk aversion between risk averse agents in the 
presence of a background risk. Although the literature covers this question extensively, 
our contribution differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, background risk 
does not need to be additive or multiplicative. Second, the two risks are not necessary 
mean independent, and may be quadrant dependent. We show that our order of cross 
Ross risk aversion is equivalent to that of partial risk premium, while our index of 
decreasing cross Ross risk aversion is equivalent to that of a decreasing partial risk 
premium. These results generalize the comparative risk aversion model developed by 
Ross (1981) for mean independent risks. Finally, we show that decreasing cross Ross 
risk aversion gives rise to the utility function family belonging to the class of n-switch 
utility functions. 
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1 Introduction
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) propose an important theorem stating that risk aversion com-
parisons using risk premia and measures of risk aversion always give the same result. Ross
(1981) shows that when an agent faces more than one risk, Arrow-Pratt measures are not strong
enough to support the plausible association between absolute risk aversion and the size of the
risk premium. He proposes a stronger ordering called Ross risk aversion. Several studies extend
Rossresults. Most papers generalize them to higher-orders of risk aversion for univariate utility
functions (see Modica and Scarsini, 2005; Jindapon and Neilson, 2007; Li, 2009; Denuit and
Eeckhoudt, 2010a). This paper provides another direction to this line of research.
There is growing concern about risk attitudes of bivariate utility function in the literature
(see Courbage, 2001; Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Eeckhoudt et al., 2007; Courbage and Rey, 2007;
Menegatti, 2009 a,b; Denuit and Eeckhoudt, 2010b; Li, 2011; Denuit et al., 2011a). To our
knowledge, these studies do not analyze comparative risk aversion. The rst paper that looks at
preservation of more risk aversewith general multivariate preferences and background risk is
Nachman (1982). However, in his setting the background risk is independent. Pratt (1988) also
considers the comparison of risk aversion both with and without the presence of an independent
background risk using a two-argument utility function.
This paper examines comparative Ross risk aversion in the setting of a positive quadrant
dependent (PQD, or negative quadrant dependent, NQD) background risk1. First, we extend
Finkelshtain et al.s (1999) research by analyzing comparative risk aversion in a slightly di¤erent
context. Then we introduce the notion of cross Ross risk aversion and show that more cross
Ross risk aversion is associated with a higher partial risk premium in the presence of a PQD
(or NQD) background risk. Hence, we demonstrate that the index of cross Ross risk aversion is
equivalent to the order of partial risk premium. We also propose the concept of decreasing cross
Ross risk aversion and derive necessary and su¢ cient conditions for obtaining an equivalence
between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and decreasing partial risk premium for a PQD
(or NQD) background risk. We apply this result to examine the e¤ects of changes in wealth
and nancial background risk on the intensity of risk aversion. Finally, we show that specic
1The concept of quadrant dependence was introduced by Lehmann (1966). Portfolio selection problems with
quadrant dependence have been explored by Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007),
among others.
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assumptions about the behavior of the decreasing cross Ross risk aversion gives rise to the utility
function form that belongs to the class of n-switch utility functions (Abbas and Bell, 2011).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some concepts of dependence.
In Section 3, we consider necessary and su¢ cient conditions for risk aversion to one risk in the
presence of a PQD (or NQD) background risk. Section 4 o¤ers the necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for comparing two agents attitudes towards risk with di¤erent utility functions.
Section 5 considers the same agents attitude at di¤erent wealth levels under a PQD (or NQD)
background risk. Section 6 applies our results to nancial background risks. Section 7 relates
decreasing cross Ross risk aversion to the n-switch independence property. Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2 Review of some concepts of dependence
Let F (x; y) denote the joint distribution and FX(x) and FY (y) the marginal distribution of ~x
and ~y. Ross (1981) consider the following relationship between ~x and ~y.
Denition 2.1 (Ross, 1981) (~x; ~y) is mean independent if E[~yj~x = x] = E(~y) for all x.
Mean independence is a stronger restriction than uncorrelatedness. However, it is weaker
than independence. Lehmann (1966) introduced the following general concept to investigate
positive dependence.
Denition 2.2 (Lehmann, 1966) (~x; ~y) is positively quadrant dependent, written PQD(~x; ~y), if
F (x; y)  FX(x)FY (y) for all x; y: (1)
(1) can be rewritten as
FX(xj~y  y)  FX(x): (2)
~x and ~y are negative quadrant dependent, written NQD(~x; ~y), if the above inequalities hold with
the inequality sign reversed. Lehmann interpreted (1) as follows: knowledge of ~y being small
increases the probability of ~x being small. In the economic literature (see for example Gollier,
2007), positive (or negative) quadrant dependence is related to rst-order stochastic dominance:
FX(x) rst-order dominates (or is dominated by) FX(xj~y  y) under PQD(~x; ~y) (NQD(~x; ~y)).
Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset of the multivariate elliptical distribution
class is PQD. For more examples, see Joe (1997).
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We now propose relationships between the three following denitions: E[~yj~x = x] = E(~y),
E[~yj~x = x] is non-decreasing in x (Finkelshtain et al., 1999) and PQD(~x; ~y).
Proposition 2.3
E[~yj~x = x] = E(~y) for all x) E[~yj~x = x] is non-decreasing in x) PQD(~x; ~y): (3)
Proof See the Appendix.
3 Risk aversion with two risks
We consider an economic agent whose preference for wealth, ~w, and a variable, ~y, can be repre-
sented by a bivariate model of expected utility. We let u(w; y) denote the utility function, and
let u1(w; y) denote @u@w and u2(w; y) denote
@u
@y , and follow the same subscript convention for the
functions u11(w; y) and u12(w; y) and so on, and assume that the partial derivatives required for
any above denition all exist and are continuous.
Let us consider the following denition of risk aversion proposed by Finkelshtain et al. (1999).
Denition 3.1 (Finkelshtain, Kella and Scarsini, 1999) An agent is risk averse in zero-mean
risk ~x with (~x; ~y) if
Eu(w + ~x; ~y)  Eu(w + E~x; ~y) (4)
for all initial wealth w.
Finkelshtain et al. (1999) provide the following necessary and su¢ cient condition on u for
obtaining risk aversion to one risk in the presence of a background risk.
Proposition 3.2 (Finkelshtain, Kella and Scarsini, 1999) The following statements are equiv-
alent:
(i) For 8w and every zero-mean risk ~x such that E[~yj~x = x] is non-decreasing in x, inequality
(4) holds;
(ii) u is submodular (i.e., u(x _ y) + u(x ^ y)  u(x) + u(y) for all x; y 2 R2) and concave
in its rst argument.
We now propose an alternative condition on u to obtain risk aversion in the presence of
PQD(~x; ~y):
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Proposition 3.3 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For 8w and every ~x with PQD(~x; ~y), inequality (4) holds;
(ii) u11  0 and u12  0.
Proof See the Appendix.
The interpretation of the sign of the u12 goes back to De Finetti (1952) and has been studied
and extended by Epstein and Tanny (1980); Richard (1975); Scarsini (1988) and Eeckhoudt et
al. (2007). For example, Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) show that u12  0 is necessary and su¢ cient
for an agent to be correlation averse, meaning that a higher level of the second argument
mitigates the detrimental e¤ect of a reduction in the rst argument. Agents are correlation
averse if they always prefer a 50-50 gamble of a loss in x or a loss in y over another 50-50 gamble
o¤ering a loss in both x and y.
Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 each have their comparative advantages. More specically, Propo-
sition 3.2, contrary to Proposition 3.3, does not require that any of the utility functions partial
derivatives be continuous. However, regarding applications, di¤erentiability is often a natural
requirement.
Proposition 3.3 shows that an agent with both risk aversion (concavity) in its rst argument
and correlation aversion dislikes a risk in the presence of a PQD background risk. We want to
quantify this e¤ect. This can be done by evaluating the maximum amount of money that this
agent is ready to pay to escape one component of the bivariate risk in the presence of the other.
Chalfant and Finkelshtain (1993) introduced the following idea into the economics literature.
Denition 3.4 (Chalfant and Finkelshtain, (1993)) For u and v, the partial risk premia u
and v in ~x for (~x; ~y) is dened as
Eu(w + ~x; ~y) = Eu(w   u + E~x; ~y) (5)
and
Ev(w + ~x; ~y) = Ev(w   v + E~x; ~y): (6)
From Proposition 3.3 we know that u11  0 and u12  0 (v11  0 and v12  0) if and only if
u  0 (v  0) for any risk ~x with PQD(~x; ~y).
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4 Comparative cross risk attitudes
The partial risk premia u and v are the maximal monetary amounts individuals u and v are
willing to pay for removing one risk in the presence of a second risk. We derive necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for comparative partial risk premia in the presence of PQD background
risk. Extension of the analysis to NQD background risk is discussed later. Let us introduce two
denitions of comparative risk aversion motivated by Ross (1981). The following denition uses
 u12(w;y)u1(w;y) and  
v12(w;y)
v1(w;y)
as local measures of correlation aversion.
Denition u is more cross Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists 1; 2 > 0 such
that for all w; y and y0
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
 1  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
(7)
and
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
 2  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (8)
When u(w; y) = U(w + y) in (7) and (8), we obtain the denition of comparative Ross
risk aversion for mean independent risks. However, we are interested in comparisons when the
agents face two dependent risks which is more general than mean independence. The following
proposition provides an equivalent comparison between risk aversion and partial risk premium
in the presence of PQD background risks.
Proposition 4.1 For u, v with u1 > 0, v1 > 0, v11 < 0, u11 < 0, u12 < 0 and v12 < 0, the
following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) u is more cross Ross risk averse than v.
(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
u = v + .
(iii) u  v for 8 w and ~x with PQD(~x; ~y).
Proof See the Appendix.
When an agent faces a PQD background risk, the cross Ross risk aversion denition estab-
lishes an unambiguous relation between more risk version and a higher willingness to pay for
insurance. Hence, the cross Ross measure of absolute risk aversion is in line with our intuition
in this partial insurance economic problem. Bacause, as mentioned in the preceding section,
5
u12  0 is necessary and su¢ cient for correlation aversion, the above proposition introduces
 u12u1 as the local measure of correlation aversion.
Proposition 4.1 introduces two extensions of Ross. First, we generalize Ross by replacing the
additive utility function by a general bivariate utility function. Second, we consider dependent
risks. Suppose at this stage that we maintain Ross assumption that E[~yj~x = x] is independent
of x. It is easy to demonstrate the following proposition in that context:
Conjecture 4.2 For u, v with u1 > 0, v1 > 0, v11 < 0 and u11 < 0, the following three
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists  > 0 such that for all (w; y): u11(w;y)v11(w;y)   
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) ;
(ii) There exists  > 0 and  : RR! R with 1  0 and 11  0 such that u = v + ;
(iii) u  v for 8 (~x; ~y) such that E[~yj~x = x] is independent of x.
In other words, Rossresult is easily extended to the bivariate case. Observe that in this
conjecture, we do not need to know anything about cross-derivatives. This means that cross-
derivatives are useful only to take PQD into account. This could be made clearer with the
following polar conjecture:
Conjecture 4.3 For u, v with u1 > 0, v1 > 0, v12 < 0 and u12 < 0, the following three
conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists  > 0 such that for all (w; y): u12(w;y)v12(w;y)   
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) ;
(ii) There exists  > 0 and  : RR! R with 1  0 and 12  0 such that u = v + ;
(iii) u  v for 8 (~x; ~y) such that ~yj~x = x is degenerated and non-decreasing in x.
Proposition 4.1 in this paper combines these two conjectures in a single proposition by linking
PQD to the sign of the cross-derivative of .
5 Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion with respect to wealth
In this section, we examine how the partial risk premium for a given risk ~x is a¤ected by a change
in initial wealth w, in the presence of a PQD background risk. Fully di¤erentiating equation (5)
with respect to w yields2
Eu1(w + ~x; ~y) = Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y)  0(w)Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y); (9)
2Equation (9) has a univariate counterpart in Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992).
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hence,
0(w) =
Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y)  Eu1(w + ~x; ~y)
Eu1(w + E~x  u; ~y) : (10)
Thus, the partial risk premium is decreasing in wealth if and only if
Eh(w + E~x  u; ~y)  Eh(w + ~x; ~y); (11)
where h   u1 is dened as minus the partial derivative of function u. Because h1 =  u11  0,
condition (11) simply states that the partial risk premium of agent h is larger than the partial
risk premium of agent u. From Proposition 4.1, this is true if and only if h is more cross Ross
risk averse than u. That is, 91; 2 > 0, for all w,y and y0, such that
h12(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1  h1(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(12)
and
h11(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2  h1(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
; (13)
or, equivalently,
 u112(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(14)
and
 u111(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
: (15)
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5.1 For u with u1 > 0, u11 < 0, u12 < 0, u111  0 and u112  0, the following
three conditions are equivalent:
(i) the partial risk premium u; associated with any PQD(~x; ~y) is decreasing in wealth;
(ii) There exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0, 12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
 u1 = u+ ;
(iii) 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0, such that
 u112(w; y)
u12(w; y)
 1   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
(16)
and
 u111(w; y)
u11(w; y)
 2   u11(w; y
0)
u1(w; y0)
: (17)
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The proof of Proposition 5.1 is obtained by using (9) to (15).
Proposition 5.1 introduces  u112(w;y)u11(w;y) and  
u111(w;y)
u11(w;y)
as local measurements of cross-prudence
and prudence. These local measures of prudence are essentially identical to the measure pro-
posed by Kimball (1990). It is well known that, for the single-risk case, DARA is equivalent
to the utility function  u0(:) being more concave than u(:) (see for example, Gollier, 2001).
Proposition 5.1 is an extension of this result to bivariate risks under a PQD background risk.
An interpretation of the sign of u112 is provided by Eeckhoudt et al. (2007), who showed that
u112 > 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for cross-prudence in its second argument,
meaning that a higher level of second argument mitigates the detrimental e¤ect of the monetary
risk.
There are economic situations where negative dependence is more pertinent. If ~x and ~y are
NQD, then ~x and  ~y are PQD. We can dene m(x; y) = u(x; y), and Propositions 3.3, 4.1 and
5.1 can be applied to m(x; y) directly.
6 Comparative risk aversion in the presence of a nancial back-
ground risk
Financial background risk has received much attention in the economics literature. For addi-
tive nancial background risk, we refer to Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a,b, 1986), Kischka
(1988), Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992), Eeckhoudt and Gollier, (2000), Schlesinger (2000), Gol-
lier (2001), Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) and Franke et al. (2011). For multiplicative nancial
background risk, see Franke et al. (2006, 2011). In this section, we consider some examples
to illustrate the use of Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 in the framework of additive or multiplicative
background risks.
6.1 Additive background risk
First, we show that Proposition 4.1 allows us to extend the results of Ross (1981) for an additive
background risk. Note that, for an additive background risk ~y, we have
u(w; y) = U(w + y) (18)
and
v(w; y) = V (w + y): (19)
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Here w can be interpreted as the random wealth of an agent and y as a random increment to
wealth, i.e., random income or nancial portfolio.
Given that
u1 = U
0 ; u11 = u12 = U 00 and u111 = u112 = U 000 (20)
and
v1 = V
0 ; v11 = v12 = V 00 and v111 = v112 = V 000; (21)
Ross (1981) proposed the following results.
Proposition 6.1 (Ross (1981, Theorem 3)) For u(w; y) = U(w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with
U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 9 > 0
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (22)
(ii) u  v for 8 w, any zero-mean risk ~x and ~y with E[~xj~y = y] = E~x = 0.
Proposition 6.2 (Ross (1981, Theorem 4)) For u(w; y) = U(w + y), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
U 000 > 0, the partial risk premium associated with any zero-mean risk ~x with E[~xj~y = y] = 0 is
decreasing in wealth if and only if, 9 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(23)
We now show that Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 generalize Rossconditions.
Conditions (7) and (8) imply
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (24)
Proposition 4.1, (20), (21) and (24) immediately entail the following result.
Corollary 6.3 For u(w; y) = U(w + y), v(w; y) = V (w + y) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 9 > 0
U 00(w + y)
V 00(w + y)
   U
0(w + y0)
V 0(w + y0)
for all w ; y and y0: (25)
(ii) u  v for 8 w and PQD(~x; ~y).
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Conditions (16) and (17) imply, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(26)
From Proposition 5.1, (20), (21) and (26), we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 6.4 For u(w; y) = U(w + y), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the following two
conditions are equivalent:
(i) the partial risk premium associated with any PQD(~x; ~y) is decreasing in wealth.
(ii) 9 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
 U
000(w + y)
U 00(w + y)
    U
00(w + y0)
U 0(w + y0)
(27)
In Corollary 6.4, the condition for decreasing risk premia under PQD risks is equivalent to
that for a rst-order stochastic dominance (FSD) improvement in an independent background
risk to decrease the risk premium, as shown by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996).
6.2 Multiplicative background risk
For a multiplicative background risk ~y, we have
u(w; y) = U(wy) (28)
and
v(w; y) = V (wy): (29)
Here w may represent the random wealth invested in a risky asset and y may represent a
multiplicative random shock on random wealth, like a variation of random interest rate.
Because
u1 = yU
0; u11 = y2U 00; u12 = U 0 + wyU 00; u111 = y3U 000 and u112 = 2yU 00 + wy2U 000 (30)
and
v1 = yV
0; v11 = y2V 00; v12 = V 0 + wyV 00; v111 = y3V 000 and v112 = 2yV 00 + wy2V 000: (31)
Conditions (7) and (8) imply, 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
 1  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
(32)
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and
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
 2  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
: (33)
Then, from Proposition 4.1, (53), (54), (57) and (33), we obtain
Corollary 6.5 For u(w; y) = U(wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with U 0 > 0, V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
V 00 < 0, the following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) 91; 2 > 0, for all w, y and y0,
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
 1  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
(34)
and
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
 2  U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
: (35)
(ii) u  v for 8 w and PQD(~x; ~y).
Because
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
V 0(wy) + wyV 00(wy)
(36)
=
U 00(wy)( U
0(wy)
U 00(wy) + wy)
V 00(wy)( V
0(wy)
V 00(wy) + wy)
=
U 00(wy)(wy   1RAU (wy))
V 00(wy)(wy   1RAV (wy))
;
where RAU (wy) =  U
00(wy)
U 0(wy) and RAV (wy) =  V
00(wy)
V 0(wy) are indices of absolute risk aversion. We
can obtain a more concise su¢ cient condition from Corollary 6.5.
Corollary 6.6 For u(w; y) = U(wy), v(w; y) = V (wy) with w > 0, ~y > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0,
V 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and V 00 < 0, If 9 > 0, for all w,y and y0,
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
   U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
; (37)
then u  v for 8 w and PQD(~x; ~y).
Proof From Corollary 6.5 and (36), we know that for all w,y and y0,
U 00(wy)
V 00(wy)
   U
0(wy0)
V 0(wy0)
(38)
and RAU (wy)  RAV (wy) imply that u  v for 8 w and PQD(~x; ~y). Using the fact that U
is more Ross risk averse than V ) RAU (wy)  RAV (wy), we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
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Corollary 6.6 states that more Ross risk aversion is a su¢ cient condition to order the
partial risk premium in the presence of PQD multiplicative background risk.
From Proposition 5.1, we obtain
Corollary 6.7 For u(w; y) = U(wy), with U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and U 000 > 0, the partial risk
premium associated with any PQD(~x; ~y) is decreasing in wealth if and only if, 91; 2 > 0, for
all w,y and y0,
 2yU
00(wy) + wy2U 000(wy)
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
 1   y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
(39)
and
 yU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
 2   y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
: (40)
Because
 2yU
00(wy) + wy2U 000(wy)
U 0(wy) + wyU 00(wy)
(41)
=  
yU 000(wy)(2 U
00(wy)
U 000(wy) + wy)
U 00(wy)( U
0(wy)
U 00(wy) + wy)
=  
yU 000(wy)(wy   2 1PU (wy))
U 00(wy)(wy   1RAU (wy))
;
where PU (wy) =  U
000(wy)
U 00(wy) is the index of absolute prudence. We can obtain a shorter su¢ cient
condition from Corollary 6.7 and (41).
Corollary 6.8 For u(w; y) = U(wy), with w > 0, ~y > 0 almost surely, U 0 > 0, U 00 < 0 and
U 000 > 0, The partial risk premium associated with PQD(~x; ~y) is decreasing in wealth if , 9 > 0,
for all w, y and y0,
 yU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
    y
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
(42)
and PU (wy)  2RAU (wy).
Moreover, (42) can be multiplied by w on both sides to obtain the results in terms of measures
of relative risk aversion and relative prudence:
 wyU
000(wy)
U 00(wy)
    wy
0U 00(wy0)
U 0(wy0)
; (43)
which implies min relative prudence  max relative risk aversion. Whereas in the literature,
PU  2RAU is an important condition for risk vulnerability (see Gollier 2001, p129), Corollary
6.8 shows that PU  2RAU is also an important condition for comparative risk aversion in the
presence of a PQD multiplicative background risk.
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7 Decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch indepen-
dence property
Because the conditions derived in Ross (1981) are fairly restrictive upon preference, some readers
may regard Rossresults as negative, because no standard utility functions (logarithmic, power,
mixture of exponentials) satisfy these conditions. Pratt (1990) suggests that probability distrib-
ution restrictions stronger than mean independence may provide more satisfactory comparative
statics. In a very di¤erent domain, Bell (1988) proposes that agents are likely to be characterized
by a utility function satisfying the one-switch rule: there exists at most one critical wealth level
at which the decision-maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other. He shows
that the linex function (linear plus exponential) is the only relevant utility function family if one
adds to the one-switch rule some very reasonable requirements. This utility function has been
studied by Bell and Fishburn (2001), Sandvik and Thorlund-Petersen (2010), Abbas and Bell
(2011) and Tsetlin and Winkler (2009, 2012). In a recent paper, Denuit et al. (2011b) show
that Rossstronger measure of risk aversion gives rise to the linex utility function and therefore
they provide not only a utility function family but also some intuitive and convenient properties
for Rossmeasure.
Abbas and Bell (2011) extend the one-switch independence property to two-attribute utility
functions, and propose a new independence assumption based on the one-switch property: n-
switch independence (see Tsetlin and Winkler, 2012, for a similar extension).
Denition (Abbas and Bell 2011) For utility function u(x; y), X is n-switch independent
of Y if two gambles ~x1 and ~x2 can switch in preference at most n times as Y progresses from its
lowest to its highest value.
They provide the following propositions:
Proposition 7.1 (Abbas and Bell 2011) X is one-switch independent of Y if and only if
u(x; y) = g0(y) + f1(x)g1(y) + f2(x)g2(y); (44)
where g1(y) has a constant sign, and g2(y) = g1(y)(y) for some monotonic function .
Proposition 7.2 (Abbas and Bell 2011) If X is n-switch independent of Y , then there exist
some functions fi, gi such that
u(x; y) = g0(y) +
n+1X
i=1
fi(x)gi(y): (45)
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We now show that the one-switch property of Proposition 7.1 is a consequence of Proposition
5.1. We also argue that (45) is a utility function that satises the decreasing cross Ross risk
aversion condition proposed in Section 3.
From Proposition 5.1 we know that the partial risk premium u, associated with any
PQD(~x; ~y) is decreasing in wealth, if and only if there exists  : R  R ! R with 1  0,
12  0 and 11  0, and  > 0 such that
 u1(x; y) = u(x; y) + (x; y): (46)
Solving the above di¤erential equation implies that u is of the form
u(x; y) =  
Z x
 1
et(t; y)dte x: (47)
If we take (x; y) =  H(x)J(y) such that J(y) has a constant sign, then we get
u(x; y) =
Z x
 1
etH(t)dte xJ(y) (48)
= [
1

exH(x)  1

Z x
 1
etH 0(t)dt]e xJ(y)
=
1

H(x)J(y)  1

Z x
 1
etH 0(t)dte xJ(y):
Dening g1(y) = g2(y) = 1J(y), f1(x) = H(x) and f2(x) =  
R x
 1 e
tH 0(t)dte x, we recognize
the functional form in Proposition 7.1.
Integrating the integral term of (48) by parts again and again, we obtain
u(x; y) =
nX
i=1
ex
( 1)i 1H(i 1)(x)
i
+
1
n
Z x
 1
et( 1)nH(n)(t)dt]e xJ(y) (49)
=
nX
i=1
J(y)
( 1)i 1H(i 1)(x)
i
+
1
n
Z x
 1
et( 1)nH(n)(t)dte xJ(y)
=
n+1X
i=1
fi(x)gi(y);
where fi(x) = ( 1)(i 1)H(i 1)(x) for i = 1; :::; n, fn+1(x) =
R x
 1 e
t( 1)nH(n)(t)dte x, gi(y) =
1
i
J(y) for i = 1; ::; n and gn+1(y) = 1nJ(y). Therefore we obtain the functional form in
Proposition 7.2 from decreasing cross Ross risk aversion. Although coming from very di¤erent
approaches, decreasing cross Ross risk aversion and n-switch independence reach the same func-
tional form. Our result thus provides a connection between decreasing cross Ross risk aversion
and n-switch independence.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we consider expected-utility preferences in a bivariate setting. The analysis focuses
on PQD random variables. The main contribution is to propose a risk premium for removing
one of the risks in the presence of a second dependent risk. To this end, we extend Ross
(1981) contribution by dening the concept of cross Ross risk aversion.We derive several
equivalence theorems relating measures of risk premia with measures of risk aversion. We then
consider additive risks and multiplicative risks as two special cases. We also show that the
decreasing cross Ross risk aversion assumption about behavior gives rise to the utility function
family that belongs to the class of n-switch utility functions. The analysis and the index of
risk aversion in this paper may be instrumental in obtaining comparative static predictions in
various applications.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3
It is obvious that E[~yj~x = x] = E(~y) implies E[~yjx] is non-decreasing in x. We now consider
PQD(~x; ~y). Cohen et al. (1994) introduce the concept of conditionally increasing in sequence:
Denition 9.1 (Cohen et al. 1994) The random variables (~y; ~x) are said to be conditionally
increasing in sequence (CIS) if
E[~yj~x = x]  E[~yj~x = x]; (50)
for x  x.
We know that E[~yj~x = x] non-decreasing in x implies that (~y; ~x) are CIS. From the theorems
in Cohen et al. (1994, Theorem 2.5) and Joe (1997, Theorem 2.3 (b)), we obtain
E[~yj~x = x] is non  decreasing in x) PQD(~x; ~y): (51)
Q.E.D.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
We will use following notations: dxF (x; y) =
@F (x;y)
@x dx, dyF (x; y) =
@F (x;y)
@y dy and dxdyF (x; y) =
@2F (x;y)
@x@y dxdy.
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(ii) implies (i): First, we have
Eu(w + ~x; ~y)  Eu(w + E~x; ~y) (52)
=
Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyF (x; y) 
Z
u(w + E~x; y)dyFY (y)

Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyF (x; y) 
Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxFX(x)dyFY (y) (because u11  0)
=
Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyF (x; y) 
Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyH(x; y);
where H(x; y) = FX(x)FY (y). From Levy (1974, corollary 4), we know thatZ Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyF (x; y) 
Z Z
u(w + x; y)dxdyH(x; y) (53)
=
Z Z
u12(w + x; y)[F (x; y) H(x; y)]dxdy
+ lim
y!1
Z
(HX(x)  FX(x))u1(w + x; y)dx+ lim
x!1
Z
(HY (y)  FY (y))u2(w + x; y)dy
=
Z Z
u12(w + x; y)[F (x; y) H(x; y)]dxdy (because FX(x) = HX(x) and FY (y) = HY (y))
=
Z Z
u12(w + x; y)[F (x; y)  FX(x)FY (y)]dxdy  0 (because u12  0 and PQD(~x; ~y)):
From the above manipulations, we obtain that Eu(w + ~x; ~y)  Eu(w + E~x; ~y).
(i) implies (ii): We prove this claim by contradictions. Suppose u12(w; y) > 0 for some w
and y. Because u12 is continuous, we have
u12(w; y) > 0 for (w; y) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]: (54)
Let us consider w0 2 [m1;m2] and ~x = k~z with k > 0, where ~z is a zero-mean risk and (~z; ~y)
is PQD with the joint distribution function G(z; y)3. Using Taylor expansion of Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y)
around w0, this yields, for any k:
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = E[u(w0; ~y)] + E[~zu1(w0; ~y)]k + o(k): (55)
Because
E~zu1(w0; ~y) (56)
= E~zEu1(w0; ~y) + Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
= Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
=
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)]dzdyu1(w0; y) (by Cuadras 2002; Theorem 1)
=
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)]u12(w0; y)dzdy:
3Lehmann (1966, Lemma 1) showed that (~x; ~y) is PQD ) (r(~x); s(~y)) is PQD, for all non-decreasing functions
r and s
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Then, from (54) we know that, when k ! 0, we get Eu(w0 + ~x; ~y) > Eu(w0; ~y) for G(z; y) such
that G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y) is positive in domain [m1;m2] [n1; n2] and zero elsewhere. This is
a contradiction.
Suppose u11(w; y) > 0 for some w and y. Because u11 is continuous, we have
u11(w; y) > 0 for (w; y) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]: (57)
Let us consider w0 2 [m01;m02] and ~x = k~z, where ~z is a zero-mean risk and (~z; ~y) are
independent. Using Taylor expansion of Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) around w0. For any k, this yields
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = E[u(w0; ~y)] +
1
2
E[u11(w0; ~y)]E~z
2k2 + o(k2): (58)
Then, from (57) we know that, when k ! 0, we get Eu(w0 + ~x; ~y) > Eu(w0; ~y) for F (x; y) such
that FY (y) has positive support on interval [n01; n02]. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
(i) implies (ii): We note that
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
 1  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
,  u12(w; y) v12(w; y)  1 
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (59)
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
 2  u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
,  u11(w; y) v11(w; y)  2 
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
: (60)
Dening  = u   v, ,where  = minf1; 2g, and di¤erentiating one obtains 1 = u1   v1,
12 = u12   v12 and 11 = u11   v11 , then (59) and (60) imply that 1  0, 12  0 and
11  0.
(ii) implies (iii): From Proposition 3.3, we know that 11  0, 12  0 and (~x; ~y) is PQD(~x; ~y)
, E(w+~x; ~y)  E(w; ~y). We also know that 1  0) (w; y)  (w v; y). The following
proof is as in Ross:
Eu(w   u + E~x; ~y) = Eu(w + ~x; ~y) (61)
= E[v(w + ~x; ~y) + (w + ~x; ~y)]
= Ev(w   v; ~y) + E(w + ~x; ~y)
 Ev(w   v; ~y) + E(w; ~y)
 Ev(w   v; ~y) + E(w   v; ~y)
= Eu(w   v + E~x; ~y):
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Because u1 > 0, u  v.
(iii) implies (i): We prove this claim by contradictions. Suppose that there exists some w, y
and y0 such that u12(w;y)v12(w;y) <
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) . Because u1, v1, u12 and v12 are continuous, we have
u12(w; y)
v12(w; y)
<
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (62)
which implies
 u12(w; y)
 v12(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (63)
this implies
v1(w; y
0)
 v12(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
 u12(w; y) for (w; y); (w; y
0) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]: (64)
If F (x; y) is a distribution function such that FY (y) has positive support on interval [n1; n2],
then we have
Ev1(w; ~y)
 v12(w; y) <
Eu1(w; ~y)
 u12(w; y) for (w; y) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]; (65)
which can be written as
u12(w; y)
Eu1(w; ~y)
>
v12(w; y)
Ev1(w; ~y)
for (w; y) 2 [m1;m2] [n1; n2]: (66)
Let us consider w0 2 [m1;m2] and ~x = k~z with k > 0, where ~z is a zero-mean risk and
(~z; ~y) is PQD with a distribution function G(z; y). Let u(k) denote its associated partial risk
premium, which is
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = Eu(w0   u(k); ~y): (67)
Di¤erentiating the equality above with respect to k yields
E~zu1(w0 + k~z; ~y) =  0u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y): (68)
Observing that u(0) = 0, we get
0u(0) =  
E~zu1(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
(69)
=  E~zEu1(w0; ~y) + Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
Eu1(w0; ~y)
=  Cov(~z; u1(w0; ~y))
Eu1(w0; ~y)
=  
R R
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)]dzdyu1(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
(by Cuadras 2002; Theorem 1)
=  
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] u12(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
dzdy
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Similarly, for v we have
0v(0) =  
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] v12(w0; y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
dzdy: (70)
Now u and v can be written in the form of a Taylor expansion around k = 0:
u(k) =  k
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] u12(w0; y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
dzdy + o(k) (71)
and
v(k) =  k
Z Z
[G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y)] v12(w0; y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
dzdy + o(k): (72)
Then, from (66) we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for F (x; y) and G(z; y) such that
FY (y) and G(z; y) GZ(z)GY (y) have positive supports on domain [m1;m2] [n1; n2]. This is
a contradiction.
Now let us turn to the other condition. Suppose that there exists some w, y and y0 such
that u11(w;y)v11(w;y) <
u1(w;y0)
v1(w;y0) . Because u1, v1, u11 and v11 are continuous, we have
u11(w; y)
v11(w; y)
<
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]; (73)
which implies
 u11(w; y)
 v11(w; y) <
u1(w; y
0)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]: (74)
This implies
 u11(w; y)
u1(w; y0)
<
 v11(w; y)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y); (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02]: (75)
If F (x; y) is a distribution function such that FY (y) has positive support on interval [n01; n02],
then we have
 Eu11(w; ~y)
u1(w; y0)
<
 Ev11(w; ~y)
v1(w; y0)
for (w; y0) 2 [m01;m02] [n01; n02] (76)
and
 Eu11(w; ~y)
Eu1(w; ~y)
<
 Ev11(w; ~y)
Ev1(w; ~y)
: (77)
Let us consider w0 2 [m01;m02] and ~x = k~z, where ~z is a zero-mean risk and ~z and ~y are
independent. Let u(k) denote its associated partial risk premium, which is dened by
Eu(w0 + k~z; ~y) = Eu(w0   u(k); ~y): (78)
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Di¤erentiating the above equality with respect to k yields
E~zu1(w0 + k~z; ~y) =  0u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y); (79)
and so 0u(0) = 0 because E~z = 0. Di¤erentiating once again with respect to k yields
E~z2u11(w0 + k~z; ~y) = [
02
uEu11(w0   u(k); ~y)  00u(k)Eu1(w0   u(k); ~y): (80)
This implies that
00u(0) =  
Eu11(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
E~z2: (81)
Similarly, for v we have
00v(0) =  
Ev11(w0; ~y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
E~z2: (82)
Now u and v can be written in the form of Taylor expansions around k = 0:
u(k) =  Eu11(w0; ~y)
Eu1(w0; ~y)
E~z2k2 + o(k2) (83)
and
v(k) =  Ev11(w0; ~y)
Ev1(w0; ~y)
E~z2k2 + o(k2): (84)
Then, from (77) we know that, when k ! 0, we get u < v for F (x; y) such that FY (y) has
positive support on interval [n01; n02]. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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